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Abstract
Social norms are powerful formalism in coordinating autonomous agents’ behaviour to
achieve certain objectives. In this paper, we propose a dynamic normative system to
enable the reasoning of the changes of norms under different circumstances, which can-
not be done in the existing static normative systems. We study two important problems
(norm synthesis and norm recognition) related to the autonomy of the entire system and
the agents, and characterise the computational complexities of solving these problems.
1. Introduction
Multiagent systems have been used to model and analyse distributed and heteroge-
neous systems, with agents being suitable for modelling software processes and phys-
ical resources. Roughly speaking, autonomy means that the system by itself, or the
agents in the system, can decide for themselves what to do and when to do it [1]. To
facilitate autonomous behaviours, agents are provided with capabilities, e.g., to gather
information by making observations (via e.g., sensors) and communicating with each
other (via e.g., wireless network), to affect the environment and other agents by taking
actions, etc. Moreover, systems and agents may have specific objectives to pursue. In
this paper, we study autonomy issues related to social norms [2], which are power-
ful formalism for the coordination of agents, by restricting their behaviour to prevent
destructive interactions from taking place, or to facilitate positive interactions [3, 4].
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Existing normative systems [5, 6, 7, 4, 8] impose restriction rules on the multiagent
systems to disallow agents’ actions based on the evaluation of current system state. An
implicit assumption behind this setting is that the normative systems do not have (nor-
mative) states to describe different social norms under different circumstances. That
is, they are static normative systems. Specifically, if an action is disallowed on some
system state then it will remain disallowed when the same system state occurs again.
However, more realistically, social norms may be subject to changes. For example, a
human society has different social norms in peacetime and wartime, and an autonomous
multiagent system may have different social norms when exposed to different levels of
cyber-attacks. This motivates us to propose a new definition of normative systems (in
Section 3), to enable the representation of norms under multiple states (hence, dynamic
normative systems). With a running example, we show that a dynamic normative sys-
tem can be a necessity if a multiagent system wants to implement certain objectives.
We focus on two related autonomy issues1. The first is norm synthesis, which is to
determine the existence of a normative system for the achievement of objectives. The
success of this problem suggests the autonomy of the multiagent system with respect
to the objectives, i.e., if all agents in the system choose to conform to the normative
system2, the objectives can be achieved. For static normative systems, norm synthesis
problem is shown to be NP-complete [10]. For our new, and more general, defini-
tion of normative systems, we show that it is EXPTIME-complete. This encouraging
decidable result shows that the maximum number of normative states can be bounded.
The second is norm recognition, which can be seen as a successive step after de-
ploying an autonomous multiagent systems (e.g., by norm synthesis). For deployed
systems such as [11], it can be essential to allow new agents to join anytime. If so, it is
generally expected that the new agent is able to recognise the current social norms after
playing in the system for a while. Under this general description, we consider two sub-
problems related to the autonomy of the system and the new agent, respectively. The
1In this paper, we consider decision problems of these autonomy issues. The algorithms for the upper
bounds in Theorem 1, 2, and 3 can be adapted to implement their related autonomy.
2The synthesised normative system is a common knowledge [9] to the agents.
2
first one, whose complexity is in PTIME, tests whether the system, under the normative
system, can be autonomous in ensuring that the new agent can eventually recognise the
norms, no matter how it plays. If such a level of autonomy is unachievable, we may
consider the second subproblem, whose success suggests that if the new agent is au-
tonomous (in moving in a smart way) then it can eventually recognise the norms. We
show that the second subproblem is PSPACE-complete.
2. Partial Observation Multiagent Systems
A multiagent system consists of a set of agents running in an environment [9]. At
each time, every agent takes a local action independently, and the environment updates
its state according to agents’ joint action. We assume that agents have only partial
observations over the system states, because in most real-world systems, agents either
do not have the capability of observing all the information (e.g., an autonomous car on
the road can only observe those cars in the surrounding area by its sensors or cameras,
etc) or are not supposed to observe private information of other agents (e.g., a car
cannot observe the destinations of other cars, etc).
Let Agt be a finite set of agents and Prop be a finite set of atomic propositions. A
finite multiagent system is a tuple M = (S , {Acti}i∈Agt, {Li}i∈Agt, {Oi}i∈Agt, I, T, π), where
S is a finite set of environment states, Acti is a finite set of local actions of agent i ∈ Agt
such that Act = Act1 × ...×Actn is a set of joint actions, Li : S → P(Acti) \ {∅} provides
on every state a nonempty set of local actions that are available to agent i, I ⊆ S is
a nonempty set of initial states, T ⊆ S × Act × S is a transition relation such that for
all s ∈ S and a ∈ Act there exists a state s′ such that (s, a, s′) ∈ T , Oi : S → O is an
observation function for each agent i ∈ Agt such thatO is a set of possible observations,
and π : S → P(Prop) is an interpretation of the atomic propositions Prop at the
states. We require that for all states s1, s2 ∈ S and i ∈ Agt, Oi(s1) = Oi(s2) implies
Li(s1) = Li(s2), i.e., an agent can distinguish two states with different sets of next
available actions.
Example 1. We consider a business system with two sets of autonomous agents: the
producer agents P = {p1, ..., pn}, and consumer agents C = {c1, ..., cm}. Let Agt = P∪C.
3
Each producer agent p j ∈ P produces a specific kind of goods with limited quantity
each time. There can be more than one agents producing the same goods. We use
g j ∈ G to denote the kind of goods that are produced by agent p j, and b j ∈ N to denote
the number of goods that can be produced at a time. Every consumer agent ci ∈ C
has a designated job which needs a set of goods to complete. It is possible that more
than one goods of a kind are needed. We use ri to denote the multiset of goods that are
required by agent ci.
We use rri ⊆ ri to denote the multiset of remaining goods to be collected for ci,
di ∈ G′ = G ∪ {⊥} to represent ci’s current demand, and ti ∈ P′ = P ∪ {⊥} to represent
the producer agent from whom ci is currently requesting goods. Every interaction of
agents occurs in two consecutive rounds, and we use k ∈ {1, 2} to denote the current
round number.
Because g j, b j, ri do not change their values in a system execution, we assume that
they are fixed inputs of the system. The multiagent system M has the state space as
S = {1, 2} × Πi∈{1,...,m}{(rri, di, ti) | rri ⊆ ri, di ∈ G′, ti ∈ P′}
where the first component {1, 2} is for the round number. The initial states are I =
{1} × Πi∈{1,...,m}{(∅,⊥,⊥)}.
The consumer agent ci has a set of actions Actci = {a⊥} ∪ {ap j | p j ∈ P}. Intuitively,
a⊥ means that an agent does nothing, and the action ap j means that agent ci sends
a request to producer p j for its goods. The producer agent p j has a set of actions
Actp j = {a⊥} ∪ {aB | B ⊆ C, |B| ≤ b j}. Intuitively, the action aB for B a subset of agents
represents that agent p j satisfies the requests from agents in B.
We use pseudocode to describe the transition relation. In the first round, i.e., k = 1,
it can be described as follows.
R1a. all consumer agents ci do the following sequential steps:
(a) if rri = ∅ then we let rri = ri. Intuitively, this represents that agent ci’s job
is repeated.
(b) if di = ⊥ then do the following: let di ∈ rri, choose an agent p j such that
di = g j, and let ti = p j. Intuitively, if there is no current demand, then
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a new demand di ∈ rri is generated, and ci sends a request to a producer
agent p j who is producing goods di.
R1b. all producer agents p j execute action a⊥, and let k = 2.
In the second round, i.e., k = 2, it can be described as follows.
R2a. all producer agents p j do the following sequential steps:
(a) select a maximal subset B of agents such that B ⊆ {ci | ti = p j} and |B| ≤ b j.
Intuitively, from the existing requests, the producer agent p j selects a set of
them according to its production capability.
(b) for all agents ci in B, let rri = rri \ {g j} and di = ti = ⊥. Intuitively, if a
demand di is satisfied, then it is removed from rri and we let di = ti = ⊥.
R2b. all consumer agents execute action a⊥, and let k = 1.
We use “var = val”, for var a variable and val one of its values, to denote an
atomic proposition. Then the labelling function π can be defined naturally over the
states. The observation Oi will be discussed in Section 6.
We provide a simple instantiation of the system3. Let n = 2, G = {g1, g2}, b1 =
b2 = 1 (two agents produce goods one at each time), m = 3, r1 = {g1}, r2 = {g2}
and r3 = {g1, g2} (three consumers with the required goods). From the initial state
s0 = (1, (∅,⊥,⊥), (∅,⊥,⊥), (∅,⊥,⊥)), we may have the following two states such that
(s0, (a⊥, a⊥, ap1 , ap2 , ap1 ), s′2) ∈ T and (s′2, (a{c1}, a{c2}, a⊥, a⊥, a⊥), s′1) ∈ T:
s′2 = (2, ({g1}, g1, p1), ({g2}, g2, p2), ({g1, g2}, g1, p1)), and
s′1 = (1, ({},⊥,⊥), ({},⊥,⊥), ({g1, g2}, g1, p1))
3. Dynamic Normative Systems
The following is our new definition of normative systems.
3The instantiation is simply to ease the understanding of the definitions in Example 1 and 2. The conclu-
sions for the example system (i.e., Proposition 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) are based on the general definition.
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Definition 1. A dynamic normative system of a multiagent system
M = (S , {Acti}i∈Agt, {Li}i∈Agt, {Oi}i∈Agt, I, T, π) is a tuple NM = (Q, δn, δu, q0) such that
Q is a set of normative states, δn : S × Q → P(Act) is a function specifying, for each
environment state and each normative state, a set of joint actions that are disallowed,
δu : Q × S → Q is a function specifying the update of normative states according to
the changes of environment states, and q0 is the initial normative state.
A (static) normative system in the literature can be seen as a special case of our
definition where the only normative state is q0. In such case, we have Q = {q0},
δu(q0, s) = q0 for all s ∈ S , and can therefore write the function δn as function δ : S →
P(Act). It is required that the function δn (and thus δ) does not completely eliminate
agents’ joint actions, i.e., δn(s, q) ⊂ Πi∈AgtLi(s) for all s ∈ S and q ∈ Q.
We give two dynamic normative systems.
Example 2. Let M be the multiagent system given in Example 1. Let s1 and s2 range
over those environmental states such that k = 1 and k = 2, respectively.
The normative system N1M = (Q1, δ1n, δ1u, q10) is such that:
• Q1 = Πp j∈P{1, ..., m}, where each producer maintains a number indicating the
consumer whose requirement must be satisfied in this normative state,
• δ1n(s1, q) = ∅, i.e., no joint actions are disallowed on s1, and (aB1 , ..., aBn, a⊥, ..., a⊥) ∈
δ1n(s2, (y1, ..., yn)) if there exists j ∈ {1, ..., n} such that B j ⊆ C and cy j < B j. Intu-
itively, for producer agent p j, an action aB j is disallowed on the second round if
B j does not contain the consumer cy j who is needed to be satisfied in this round.
• δ1u(q, s2) = q and δ1u((y1, ..., yn), s1) = (y′1, ..., y′n) such that y′j = (y j mod m) +
1 for j ∈ {1, ..., n}; intuitively, the normative state increments by 1 and loops
forever.
• q10 = (1, ..., n), i.e., producer agents p j start from c j.
For the instantiation in Example 1, we have that
• Q1 = {1, 2, 3} × {1, 2, 3}, q10 = (1, 2),
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• (aB1 , aB2 , a⊥, a⊥, a⊥) ∈ δ1n(s′2, (1, 2)) if either B1 ∈ {∅, {c2}, {c3}, {c2, c3}} or B2 ∈
{∅, {c1}, {c3}, {c1, c3}},
• δ1u((1, 2), s1) = (2, 3), δ1u((2, 3), s1) = (3, 1).
We define another normative system N2M = (Q2, δ2n, δ2u, q20) by extending the number
maintained by each producer into a first-in-first-out queue so that the ordering between
consumers who have sent the requests matters. That is, we have Q2 = Πp j∈P({ǫ} ∪
{i1...ik | k ∈ {1, ..., m}, ix ∈ C for 1 ≤ x ≤ k}) where the symbol ǫ denotes an empty
queue, and q20 = Πp j∈P{ǫ} which means that producers start from empty queues. The
functions δ2n and δ2u can be adapted from N1M , and details are omitted here.
The following captures the result of applying a normative system on a multiagent
system, which is essentially a product of these two systems.
Definition 2. Let M be a multiagent system and NM a normative system on M, the
result of applying NM on M is a Kripke structure K(NM) = (S †, I†, T †, π†) such that
• S † = S × Q is a set of states,
• I† = I × {q0} is a set of initial states,
• T † ⊆ S † × S † is such that, for any two states (s1, q1) and (s2, q2), we have
((s1, q1), (s2, q2)) ∈ T † if and only if, (1) there exists an action a ∈ Act such that
(s1, a, s2) ∈ T and a < δn(s1, q1), and (2) q2 = δu(q1, s2). Intuitively, the first
condition specifies the enabling condition to transit from state s1 to state s2 by
taking a joint action a which is allowed in the normative state q1. The second
condition specifies that the transition relation needs to be consistent with the
changes of normative states.
• π† : S † → P(Prop) is such that π†((s, q)) = π(s).
Example 3. For the instantiation, in the structure K(N1M), we have
((s0, (1, 2)), (s′2, (1, 2))), ((s′2, (1, 2)), (s′1, (2, 3))) ∈ T †. The latter is because
(s′2, (a{c1}, a{c2}, a⊥, a⊥, a⊥), s′1) ∈ T, {c1} < {∅, {c2}, {c3}, {c2, c3}},
and {c2} < {∅, {c1}, {c3}, {c1, c3}}.
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For a = (a{c1}, a{c3}, a⊥, a⊥, a⊥) and s′′1 = (1, ({},⊥,⊥), ({g2}, g2, p2), ({g1},⊥,⊥)),
we have (s′2, a, s′′1 ) ∈ T but ((s′2, (1, 2)), (s′′1 , (2, 3))) < T †. This is because, for p2, it is
required to make c2 as its current priority according to the normative state, and cannot
choose to satisfy c3 instead.
We remark that, the normative system, as many current formalisms, imposes hard
constraints on the agents’ behaviour. As stated in e.g., [12], social norms may be soft
constraints that agents can choose to comply with or not. To accommodate soft social
norms, we can redefine the function δn as δn : S × Q × Act → U to assign each joint
action a cost utility for every agent, on each environment state and normative state.
With this definition, norms become soft constraints: agents can choose to take destruc-
tive actions, but are encouraged to avoid them due to their high costs. The objective
language to be introduced in the next section also needs to be upgraded accordingly to
express properties related to the utilities. We leave such an extension as a future work.
4. Objective Language
To specify agents’ and the system’s objectives, we use temporal logic CTL [13]
whose syntax is as follows.
φ ::= p | ¬φ | φ1 ∨ φ2 | EXφ | E(φ1 U φ2) | EGφ
where p ∈ Prop. Intuitively, formula EXφ expresses that φ holds at some next state,
E(φ1 U φ2) expresses that on some path from current state, φ1 holds until φ2 becomes
true, and EGφ expresses that on some path from current state, φ always holds. Other
operators can be obtained as usual, e.g., EFφ ≡ E(True U φ), AGφ ≡ ¬E(True U ¬φ),
AFφ = ¬EG¬φ etc.
A path in a Kripke structure K(NM) is a sequence s0s1... of states such that (si, si+1) ∈
T † for all i ≥ 0. The semantics of the language is given by a relation K(NM), s |= φ for
s ∈ S †, which is defined inductively as follows [13]:
1. K(NM), s |= p if p ∈ π†(s),
2. K(NM), s |= ¬φ if not K(NM), s |= φ,
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3. K(NM), s |= φ1 ∨ φ2 if K(NM), s |= φ1 or K(NM), s |= φ2,
4. K(NM), s |= EXφ if there exists a state s′ ∈ S † such that (s, s′) ∈ T † and
K(NM), s′ |= φ,
5. K(NM), s |= E(φ1 U φ2) if there exists a path s0 s1 . . . and a number n ≥ 0 such
that s0 = s, K(NM), sk |= φ1 for 0 ≤ k ≤ n − 1 and K(NM), sn |= φ2,
6. K(NM), s |= EGφ if there exists a path s0s1 . . . such that s0 = s and K(NM), sk |=
φ for all k ≥ 0.
The verification problem, denoted as K(NM) |= φ, is, given a multiagent system
M, its associated normative system NM , and an objective formula φ, to decide whether
K(NM), s |= φ for all s ∈ I†. The norm synthesis problem is, given a system M and
an objective formula φ, to decide the existence of a normative system NM such that
K(NM) |= φ. The norm recognition problem will be defined in Section 6. For the
measurement of the complexity, we take the standard assumption that the sizes of the
multiagent system and the normative system are measured with the number of states,
and the size of the objective formula is measured with the number of operators.
Example 4. For the system in Example 1, interesting objectives expressed in CTL may
include
φ1 ≡
∧
i∈C
∧
j∈P
AG (ti = p j ⇒ EF di = ⊥)
which says that it is always the case that if there is a request from a consumer ci to a
producer p j (i.e., ti = p j), then the request is possible to be satisfied eventually (i.e.,
di = ⊥), and
φ2 ≡
∧
i∈C
∧
j∈P
AG (ti = p j ⇒ AF di = ⊥)
which says that it is always the case that if there is a request from a consumer ci to
a producer p j, then on all the paths the request will eventually be satisfied. Both φ1
and φ2 are liveness objectives that are important for an ecosystem to guarantee that no
agent can be starving forever. The objective φ2 is stronger than φ1, and their usefulness
is application-dependent. The following proposition shows that static normative sys-
tems are insufficient to guarantee the satisfiability of the objectives in this ecosystem.
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Proposition 1. There exists an instance of a multiagent system M such that, for all
static normative systems NM , we have that K(NM) 6|= φ1 ∧ φ2.
The proof idea is based on the following simple case. Assume that there are one
producer p1, such that b1 = 1, and two consumers c1 and c2, such that r1 = r2 =
{g1}. There only exist the following three static normative systems which have different
restrictions on an environment state s2 = (2, ({g1}, g1, p1), ({g1}, g1, p1)): (Recall that
q0 is the only normative state in static normative systems.)
• N3M is such that δ
3
n(s2, q0) = {a{c1}}, i.e., c1 is not satisfied.
• N4M is such that δ4n(s2, q0) = {a{c2}}, i.e., c2 is not satisfied.
• N5M is such that δ5n(s2, q0) = ∅, i.e., no restriction is imposed.
We can see that K(NhM) 6|= φ1 for h ∈ {3, 4} and K(N5M) 6|= φ2. The former is because
one of the agents is constantly excluded from being satisfied. For the latter, there exists
an infinite path s0(s2s1)∞ such that s0 = (1, (∅,⊥,⊥), (∅,⊥,⊥)) is an initial state, s2 is
given as above, and s1 = (1, (∅,⊥,⊥), ({g1}, g1, p1)) is the state on which consumer c1i ’s
requirement is satisfied. On this path, the requirement from c2i is never satisfied. On
the other hand, for the dynamic normative systems in Example 2, all the consumers’
requests can be satisfied, so we have the following conclusion.
Proposition 2. Given a system M and a normative system N1M or N2M , we have that
K(NhM) |= φ1 ∧ φ2 for h ∈ {1, 2}.
The above example suggests that, to achieve some objectives, we need dynamic
normative systems to represent the changes of social norms under different circum-
stances. Then, another question may follow about the maximum number of normative
states. The dynamic system could be uninteresting if the number of states can be in-
finite. Fortunately, in the next section, we show with the complexity result that, for
objectives expressed with CTL formulas, in the worst case, an exponential number of
normative states are needed.
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5. The Complexity of Norm Synthesis
We have the following result for norm synthesis.
Theorem 1. The norm synthesis problem is EXPTIME-complete, with respect to the
sizes of the system and the objective formula.
Proof: We first show the upper bound: EXPTIME Membership.
From M = (S , {Acti}i∈Agt, {Li}i∈Agt, {Oi}i∈Agt, I, T, π), we define a Bu¨chi tree automa-
ton AM = (Σ, D, Q, δ, q0, Q) such that
1. Σ = P(V) ∪ {⊥}, Q = S × {⊤, ⊢,⊥}, q0 = (s,⊤) for s ∈ I,
2. D =
⋃
s∈S {1, ..., |T (s)|}where T (s) = {s′ | ∃a ∈ Act : (s, a, s′) ∈ T },
3. δ : Q × Σ × D → 2Q∗ is defined as follows: for s ∈ S and k = |T (s)| with T (s) =
(s1, ..., sk), we have (a) if m ∈ {⊢,⊥} then δ((s, m),⊥, k) = {((s1,⊥), ..., (sk,⊥))},
and (b) if m ∈ {⊢,⊤}, then we let ((s1, y1), ..., (sk, yk)) ∈ δ((s, m), π(s), k) such
that, there exists a nonempty set B ⊆ {1, ..., k} of indices such that
(a) yi = ⊤, for all i ∈ B, and
(b) y j = ⊢, for all j < B and 1 ≤ j ≤ k.
Note that we use F = Q to express that we only care about infinite paths. Moreover,
the formula φ needs to be modified to reject those runs where⊥ is labeled on the states.
This can be done by following the approach in [14]. We still call the resulting formula
φ.
Given a CTL formula φ and a set D ⊂ N with a maximal element k, there exists a
Bu¨chi tree automaton AD,¬φ that accepts exactly all the tree models of ¬φ with branch-
ing degrees in D. By [15], the size of AD,¬φ is O(2k·|φ|). The norm synthesis problem
over M and φ for φ a CTL formula is equivalent to checking the emptiness of the prod-
uct automaton AM × AD,¬φ. The checking of emptiness of Bu¨chi tree automaton can
be done in quadratic time, so the norm synthesis problem for φ a CTL formula can be
done in exponential time.
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Therefore, the norm synthesis problem over M and φ can be done in exponential
time with respect to |S |, |
⋃
i∈Agt Actsi|, and |φ|. That is, it is in EXPTIME.
We then show the lower bound: EXPTIME Hardness
The lower bound is reduced from the problem of a linearly bounded alternat-
ing Turing machine (LBATM) accepting an empty input tape, which is known to be
EXPTIME-complete [16]. Let AT be an LBATM. A system M(AT ) of a single agent
is constructed such that the agent moves on ∃ states and the environment moves on
∀ states. The normative system, applied on the agent’s behaviour, may prune some
branches of the system. We use an objective formula φ to express that the result-
ing system correctly implements several modification rules (which makes the resulting
system moves as the AT does) and all paths lead to accepting states. Therefore, the
norm synthesis problem on the system M(AT ) and the objective formula φ is equiva-
lent to the acceptance of the automaton AT on empty tape. That is, the complexity is
EXPTIME hard.
An alternating Turing machine AT is a tuple (Q, Γ, δ, q0, g) where Q is a finite set
of states, Γ is a finite set of tape symbols including a blank symbol ⊥, δ : Q × Γ →
P(Q × Γ × {−1,+1}) is a transition function, q0 ∈ Q is an initial state, g : Q →
{∀,∃, accept, re ject} specifies the type of each state. We use b ∈ Γ to denote the blank
symbol. The input w to the machine is written on the tape. We use wi to denote the
alphabet written on the ith cell of the tape.
The size of a Turing machine is defined to be the size of space needed to record its
transition relation, i.e., 2 × |Γ|2 × |Q|2. An LBATM is an ATM which uses m tape cells
for a Turing machine description of size m. Let L = {1, ..., m}. A configuration of the
machine contains a state q ∈ Q, the header position h ∈ L, and the tape content v ∈ Γ∗.
A configuration c = (q, h, v) is accepting if g(q) = accept, or g(q) = ∀ and all successor
configurations are accepting, or g(q) = ∃ and at least one of the successor configuration
is accepting. The machine AT accepts an empty tape if the initial configuration of M
(the state of M is q0, the head is at the left end of the tape, and all tape cells contain
symbol⊥) is accepting, and to reject if the initial configuration is rejecting. It is known
that the problem is EXPTIME-complete.
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We construct a multiagent system M with a single agent i. We have
M = (S , {Acti}i∈Agt, {Li}i∈Agt, {Oi}i∈Agt, I, T, π) where
1. S = (Q × L) ∪ (Q × L × Γ) ∪ (Q × L × L × Γ),
2. Acti = {a2, a3} ∪ {arcd | r ∈ Q, c ∈ Γ, d ∈ {−1,+1}} ∪ Σ,
3. the function Li is defined as
(a) Li((ti, oq,h)) = Σ,
(b) Li((ti, oq,h,b)) = {a2} for g(q) = ∀,
(c) Li((ti, oq,h,b)) = {arcd | r ∈ Q, c ∈ Γ, d ∈ {−1,+1}} for (r, c, d) ∈ δ(q, b) and
g(q) = ∃, and
(d) Li((ti, oq,h1,h2,c)) = {a3}.
4. the function Oi is defined as follows: Oi((q, h)) = oq,h, Oi((q, h, b)) = oq,h,b,
Oi((q, h1, h2, c)) = oq,h1,h2,c.
5. I = {(q0, 1)},
6. the transition relation T is defined as follows:
(a) ((q, h), b, (q, h, b)) ∈ T for b ∈ Γ.
(b) ((q, h, b), a2, (r, h + d, h, c)) ∈ T for (r, c, d) ∈ δ(q, b) and g(q) = ∀.
(c) ((q, h, b), arcd, (r, h + d, h, c)) ∈ T for g(q) = ∃.
(d) ((r, h1, h2, c), a3, (r, h1)) ∈ T .
Intuitively, a transition (r, c, d) ∈ δ(q, b) is simulated by three consecutive transitions:
1. ((q, h), b, (q, h, b)), where the agent guesses the correct symbol written in cell h.
2. ((q, h, b), a, (r, h+ d, h, c)) such that if a = a2 then the state q is an ∀ state and it
is the environment that moves according to δ, and if a = arcd then the state q is
an ∃ state and it is the agent that moves according to δ.
3. ((r, h + d, h, c), a3, (r, h + d)), where the system makes a deterministic transition.
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For the second transition, we let the environment move on ∀ states because all the
successor states have to be explored, while let the agent move on ∃ states so that it
allows the normative system to prune some branches.
Let V = {Qq | q ∈ Q} ∪ {Hh,Gh | h ∈ L} ∪ {Rb, Wb | b ∈ Γ} ∪ {acc, k2} be a set of
boolean variables. Intuitively, Qq represents that the current state is q, Hh represents
that the current header position is h, Gh represents that the last header position is h, Rb
represents that the symbol on the current cell is b, and Wb represents that the symbol
written on the last header position is b. We define the labelling function π as follows:
{Qq, Hh} ⊆ π((q, h)), {Qq, Hh, Rb, k2} ⊆ π((q, h, b)), {Qr , Hh1 ,Gh2 , Wc} ⊆ π((r, h1, h2, c)),
acc ∈ π((q, h)) if g(q) = accept. Moreover, we let F = ∅.
We need the following formulas.
1. Formula φ1(h) ≡ A((Hh∧k2 ⇒ R⊥) U ∨c∈Γ(Gh∧Wc)) expresses that the symbol
on position h is ⊥ until it is modified.
2. Formula φ2(h, b) ≡ Gh ∧Wb ⇒ A((Hh ∧ k2 ⇒ Rb) U ∨c∈Γ(Gh ∧Wc)) expresses
that once the symbol on position h is modified into b, it will stay the same until
the next modification occurs.
Then the formula to be model checked on the system is
φ = (
∧
h∈L
φ1(h) ∧ AG
∧
h∈L
∧
b∈Γ
φ2(h, b)) ∧ AFacc
Intuitively, the norm synthesis problem over M and φ is to determine the existence of a
normative system, which by pruning the behaviour of the agent, can make the resulting
system correctly implements the modification rules and all branches can be accepting.
Therefore, the norm synthesis problem is equivalent to the acceptance of the automaton
AT on empty tape. That is, the complexity is EXPTIME hard. 
6. Agent Recognition of Social Norms
For a multiagent system to be autonomous without human intervention, it is impor-
tant that it can maintain its functionality when new agents join or old agents leave. For
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a new agent to join and function well, it is essential that it is capable of recognising the
social norms that are currently active. As stated in the previous sections, the agent has
only partial observation over the system state, and is not supposed to observe the social
norms. On the other hand, it is also unrealistic to assume that the agent does not know
anything about the social norms of the system it is about to join. Agent is designed
to have a set of prescribed capabilities and is usually supposed to work within some
specific scenarios. Therefore, the actual situation can be that, the agent knows in prior
that there are a set of possible normative systems, one of which is currently applied
on the multiagent system. We remark that, assuming a set of normative systems does
not weaken the generality of the setting, because Theorem 1 implies that there are a fi-
nite number of possible normative systems (subject to a bisimulation relation between
Kripke structures). This situation naturally leads to the following two new problems:
• (NC1) to determine whether the agent can always recognise which normative
system is currently applied; and
• (NC2) to determine whether the agent can find a way to recognise which norma-
tive system is currently applied.
The successful answer to the problem NC1 implies the successful answer to the prob-
lem NC2, but not vice versa. Intuitively, the successful answer of NC1 implies a high-
level autonomy of the system that the new agent can be eventually incorporated into
the system no matter how it behaves. We assume that once learned the social norms
the new agent will behave accordingly. If such an autonomy of the system cannot be
achieved, the successful answer of NC2 implies a high-level autonomy of the agent
that, by moving in a smart way, it can eventually recognise the social norms.
We formalise the problems first. Let Ψ be a set of possible normative systems de-
fined on a multiagent system, Path(K(N)) be the set of possible paths of the Kripke
structure K(N) for N ∈ Ψ. We assign every normative system in Ψ a distinct in-
dex, denoted as ind(N). This index is attached to every path ρ ∈ Path(K(N)), and let
ind(ρ) = ind(N).
Let the new agent be x such that x < Agt and its observation function be Ox. For
any state (s, q) ∈ S †, we define a projection function (̂s, q) = s. So ρ̂ is the projection of
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a path ρ of a Kripke structure to the associated multiagent system. We extend Ox to the
paths of Kripke structure K(N) as follows: Ox(ρs†) = Ox(ρ) ·Ox(ŝ†) for ρ ∈ Path(K(N)
and s† ∈ S †. We have Ox(ǫ) = ǫ, which means when a path is empty, the observation
is also empty. We also define its inverse O−1x which gives a sequence o of observations,
returns a set of possible paths ρ on which agent x’s observations are o, i.e.,
O−1x (o) = {ρ ∈ Path(K(N)) | Ox(ρ) = o, N ∈ Ψ}.
W.l.o.g., we assume that N0 ∈ Ψ is the active normative system. Let N be the set of
natural numbers, we have
Definition 3. NC1 problem is the existence of a number k ∈ N such that for all paths
ρ ∈ Path(K(N0)) such that |ρ| ≥ k, we have that ρ′ ∈ O−1x (Ox(ρ)) implies that ind(ρ′) =
ind(ρ).
NC2 problem is the existence of a path ρ ∈ Path(K(N0)) such that for all ρ′ ∈
O−1x (Ox(ρ)) we have ind(ρ′) = ind(ρ).
Intuitively, NC1 states that as long as the path is long enough, the new agent can even-
tually know that the active normative system is N0. That is, no matter how the new
agent behaves, it can eventually recognise the current normative system. On the other
hand, NC2 states that such a path exists (but not necessarily for all paths). That is, to
recognise the normative system, the new agent needs to move smartly.
Example 5. For the system in Example 1, we assume a new consumer agent cv such
that v = m + 1. Also, we define Ocv(s) = {ci | ci ∈ C, ti(s) = tv(s) , ⊥} for all s ∈ S .
Intuitively, the agent cv keeps track of the set of agents that are currently having the
same request. Unfortunately, we have
Proposition 3. There exists an instance of system M such that under the set Ψ =
{N1M , N
2
M} of normative systems, both NC1 and NC2 are unsuccessful.
This can be seen from a simple case where there are a single producer p1 with
b1 = 1 and a set of consumers C such that ri = {g1} for all ci ∈ C. For the initial
state, every consumer sends its request to p1, so {ci | ti = p1} = C. For any path
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ρ1 of K(N1M) and ρ2 of K(N2M), we have ρ̂1 = ρ̂2 = s0 s2 s11s2...sm1 s2 sv1s2 s11... where
s0 = (1, (∅,⊥,⊥), ..., (∅,⊥,⊥)), s2 = (2, ({g1}, g1, p1), ..., ({g1}, g1, p1)), and si1 is differ-
ent with s2 in ci’s local state, e.g., s11 = (1, ({},⊥,⊥), ..., ({g1}, g1, p1)). And therefore
Ocv(ρ1) = Ocv (ρ2) = ∅C(C \ {c1})C(C \ {c2})..., i.e., the agent cv’s observations are
always the same4. That is, the new agent cv finds that for ρ1, the single path on K(N1M),
there are ρ2 ∈ O−1cv (Ocv(ρ1)) and ind(ρ1) , ind(ρ2). Therefore, neither NC1 nor NC2
can be successful in such a case.
The reasons for the above result may come from either the insufficient capabilities
of the agent or the designing of normative systems. We explain this in the following
example.
Example 6. First, consider that we increase the capabilities of the new agent by up-
dating the rule R2b in Section 2.
R2b’. the new agent cv may cancel its current request by letting dv = tv = ⊥; all other
consumer agents execute action a⊥; and let k = 1.
With this upgraded capabilities of the new agent, the NC2 can be successful. The
intuition is that, by canceling and re-requesting for at least twice, the ordering of con-
sumer agents whose requests are satisfied can be different in two normative systems:
with N2M , there are other agents ci between cm and cv, but with N1M , their requests are
always satisfied consecutively. Note that, by its new capabilities, cv can always choose
a producer agent which have more than 2 existing and future requests (Assuming that
n ≪ m, which is usual for a business ecosystem).
Proposition 4. With the new rule R2b’, the NC2 problem is successful on system M
and the set Ψ = {N1M , N2M}.
However, the NC1 problem is still unsuccessful, because the agent cv may not move
in such a smart way. For this, we replace N1M with N6M = (Q1, δ1n, δ6u, q10) such that
4We reasonably assume that, for N1M , when a producer sees cv, it will adjust its range in normative states
from {1, ...,m} to {1, ...,m, v}.
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• δ6u(q, s2) = q and δ6u((y1, ..., yn), s1) = (y′1, ..., y′n), s.t. y′j = ((y j + 1) mod m) + 1
for j ∈ {1, ..., n}. Intuitively, the normative state increments by 2 (modulo m).
Proposition 5. Both NC1 and NC2 problems are successful on system M and the set
Ψ = {N2M , N
6
M}.
7. The Complexity of Norm Recognition
The discussion in the last section clearly shows that, the two norm recognition prob-
lems are non-trivial. It is therefore useful to study if there exist efficient algorithms that
can decide them automatically. In this section, we show a somewhat surprising result
that the determination of NC1 problem can be done in PTIME, while it is PSPACE-
complete for NC2 problem. Assume that the size of the set Ψ is measured over both
the number of normative systems and the number of normative states. We have the
following conclusions.
Theorem 2. The NC1 problem can be decided in PTIME, with respect to the sizes of
the system and the set Ψ.
Proof: First of all, by its definition in Definition 3, the unsuccessful answer to an
NC1 instance is equivalent to the existence of two infinite paths ρ ∈ Path(K(N0)) and
ρ′ ∈ O−1x (Ox(ρ)) such that ind(ρ′) , ind(ρ). In the following, we give an algorithm to
check such an existence.
Recall that x is the new agent. Let K(N) = (S †N , I†N , T †N , π†N) be the Kripke structure
obtained by applying the normative system N ∈ Ψ on the system M. We define the
function O†x over the states
⋃
N∈Ψ S †N by letting O
†
x((s, q)) = Ox(s) for all (s, q) ∈ S †N .
Moreover, we extend the ind function to work with the states in ⋃N∈Ψ S †N by letting
ind((s, q)) = ind(N) for q being a normative state of N.
A product system is constructed by synchronising the behaviour of two Kripke
structures K(N0) and K(N) for N ∈ Ψ \ {N0} such that the observations are always
the same. Let Prop′ = {sa f e} be the set of atomic propositions. Formally, it is the
structure M′ = (S ′, I′, T ′, π′) such that
• S ′ = S †N0 ×
⋃
N∈Ψ,N,N0 S
†
N ,
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• (s, t) ∈ I′ if s ∈ I†N0 and t ∈
⋃
N∈Ψ,N,N0 I
†
N such that O
†
x(s) = O†x(t).
• ((s, t), (s′, t′)) ∈ T ′ if and only if (s, s′) ∈ T †N0 , (t, t′) ∈ T
†
N for some N ∈ Ψ and
N , N0, and O†x(t) = O†x(t′) and
• sa f e ∈ π((s, t)) iff ind(s) , ind(t).
Intuitively, the structure consists of two components: one component moves according
to the Kripke structure K(N0) (that is, the currently active normative system), and the
other moves according to other Kripke structures K(N) by matching the observations of
the new agent x. Therefore, we have the equivalence of the following two statements:
• the existence of two infinite paths ρ ∈ Path(K(N0)) and ρ′ ∈ O−1x (Ox(ρ)) such
that ind(ρ′) , ind(ρ);
• the existence of an infinite path in the structure M′ such that all states on the path
are labelled with sa f e.
Then, the existence of an infinite path where all states are labelled with an atomic
proposition can be reduced to 1) the removal of all states (and their related transitions)
not labelled with the atomic proposition and then 2) the checking of reachable strongly
connected components (SCCs).
For the complexity, we notice that M′ is polynomial over M and Ψ, and the check-
ing of reachable SCCs can be done in PTIME by the Tarjan’s algorithm [17]. 
Theorem 3. The NC2 problem is PSPACE-complete, with respect to the sizes of the
system and the set Ψ.
Proof:
We first show the upper bound: PSPACE Membership
The upper bound is obtained by having a nondeterministic algorithm which takes a
polynomial size of space, i.e., it is in NPSPACE=PSPACE.
First of all, by its definition in Definition 3, the successful answer to an NC2 in-
stance is equivalent to the existence of a finite paths ρ ∈ Path(K(N0)) such that all
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paths ρ′ ∈ O−1x (Ox(ρ)) of the same observation belongs to K(N0), i.e., ind(ρ′) = ind(ρ).
The idea of our algorithm is as follows. It starts by guessing a set of initial states of
the structures {K(N) | N ∈ Ψ} on which agent x has the same observation. It then con-
tinuously guesses the next set of states such that they are reachable in one step from
some state in the current set and on which agent x has the same observation. If this
guess can be done infinitely then the NC2 problem is successful. This infinite number
of guesses can be achieved with a finite number of guesses, by adapting the approach
of LTL model checking [13].
Let Prop′′ = {goal} be the set of atomic propositions. We define the structure
M′′ = (S ′′, I′′, T ′′, π′′) such that
• S ′′ = S †N0 × P(
⋃
N∈Ψ S †N),
• (s, P) ∈ I′′ if s ∈ I†N0 and P ⊆
⋃
N∈Ψ I
†
N such that t ∈ P iff O
†
x(s) = O†x(t),
• ((s, P), (t, Q)) ∈ T ′′ if and only if (s, t) ∈ T †N0 and Q = {t′ | ∃s′ ∈ P∃N ∈ Ψ :
(s′, t′) ∈ T †N , O†x(t′) = O†x(t)}, and
• goal ∈ π((s, P)) iff for all states s ∈ P we have ind(s) = ind(N0).
Intuitively, each path of the structure M′′ represents a path in K(N0) (in the first compo-
nent) together with the set of paths with the same observation for agent x (in the second
component). Therefore, we can have the equivalence of the following two statements:
• the existence of a finite paths ρ ∈ Path(K(N0)) such that all paths ρ′ ∈ O−1x (Ox(ρ))
of the same observation belongs to K(N0), i.e., ind(ρ′) = ind(ρ);
• in structure M′′, the existence of an initial state such that it can reach some state
satisfying goal.
For the complexity of the algorithm, we note that although the system M′′ is of
exponential size, the reachability can be done on-the-fly by using a polynomial size of
space.
We then show the lower bound: PSPACE Hardness
It is obtained by a reduction from the problem of deciding if, for a given nondeter-
ministic finite state automaton A over an alphabet Σ, the language L(A) is equivalent
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to the universal language Σ∗. Let A = (Q, q0, δ, F) be an NFA such that Q is a set of
states, q0 ∈ Q is an initial state, δ : Q × Σ → P(Q) is a transition function, and F ⊆ Q
is a set of final states. We construct a system M(A) which consists of two subsystems,
one of them simulates the behaviour of A and the other simulates the behaviour of the
language Σ∗. The subsystems are reachable from an initial state s0 by two actions a1
and a2 respectively. Let Σ1 = Σ ∪ {⊥} such that ⊥ < Σ is a symbol. Formally, we have
that M(A) = (S , {Acti}i∈Agt, {Li}i∈Agt, {Oi}i∈Agt, I, T, π) is a single-agent system such that
• Agt = {x},
• S = S 1 ∪ S 2 ∪ {s0, sloop} with S 1 = Σ1 × Q and S 2 = {sa | a ∈ Σ1},
• Actx = Σ ∪ {a1, a2},
• Lx(s0) = {a1, a2} and Lx(s) = Σ for s ∈ S \ {s0},
• Ox(s0) = Ox(sloop) = ⊥, Ox((a, q)) = a for (a, q) ∈ Σ1 × Q, and Ox(sa) = a for
a ∈ Σ1, where O = Σ1,
• I(s0) = 1,
• the transition relation T consists of the following five sets of transitions:
– {(s0, a1, (⊥, q0)), (s0, a2, s⊥)}; intuitively, from the initial state s0, it can tran-
sit into the subsystem M1(A) by taking action a1 or the subsystem M2(A)
by taking action a2,
– {((a, q), a1, (a1, q1)) | q, q1 ∈ Q, a ∈ Σ1, a1 ∈ Σ, q1 ∈ δ(q, a1)}; intuitively,
the subsystem M1(A) follows the behaviour of the automaton A,
– {((a, q), a1, sloop) | q ∈ Q, a, a1 ∈ Σ, δ(q, a1) = ∅}; intuitively, in M1(A), all
illegal actions take the system state into a designated state sloop,
– {(sloop, a, sloop) | a ∈ Σ}; intuitively, the state sloop is a loop state for all
actions,
– {sa, a1, sa1 ) | a ∈ Σ1, a1 ∈ Σ}; intuitively, the subsystem M2(A) simulates the
language Σ∗, and
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• π will not be used.
The new agent x is the only agent of the system. On the system M(A), we have two
normative systems whose only difference is on the state s0: N0 disallows action a1 and
N1 disallows action a2. Formally, N0 = ({t0}, δ0n, δ0u, t0) such that
• δ0n(s0, t0) = {a1}, δ0n(s, t0) = ∅ for all s ∈ S \ {s0}, and
• δ0u(t0, s) = t0 for all s ∈ S .
and N1 = ({t1}, δ1n, δ1u, t1) such that
• δ1n(s0, t1) = {a2}, δ1n(s, t1) = ∅ for all s ∈ S \ {s0}, and
• δ1u(t1, s) = t0 for all s ∈ S .
Now we show that the universality of the NFA A is equivalent to the unsuccessful
answer to the NC2 problem on M(A) and Ψ = {N0, N1}.
(⇒) Assume that the automaton A is universal. Then for all paths ρ ∈ K(N0), there
exists another path ρ′ ∈ K(N1) such that Ox(ρ) = Ox(ρ′). The inverse statement of the
latter is that, there exists a finite path ρ ∈ K(N0) such that there exists no ρ′ ∈ K(N1)
such that Ox(ρ) = Ox(ρ′). The latter means that, all paths ρ′ with Ox(ρ) = Ox(ρ′) are in
K(N0), which is the statement of NC2 problem.
(⇐) Assume that we have the unsuccessful answer to the NC2 problem on M(A)
and Ψ = {N0, N1}. Then by the definition, it means that for all paths ρ ∈ K(N0), there
exists another path ρ′ ∈ K(N1) such that Ox(ρ) = Ox(ρ′). The latter is equivalent to the
fact that the automaton A is universal.

8. Related Work
Normative multiagent systems have attracted many research interests in recent
years, see e.g., [12, 18] for comprehensive reviews of the area. Here we can only
review some closely related work.
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Norm synthesis for static normative systems. As stated, most current formalisms
of normative systems are static. [10] shows that this norm synthesis problem is NP-
complete. [7] proposes a norm synthesis algorithm in declarative planning domains for
reachability objectives, and [8] considers the on-line synthesis of norms. [19] considers
the norm synthesis problem by conditioning over agents’ preferences, expresses as
pairs of LTL formula and utility, and a normative behaviour function.
Changes of normative system. [20] represents the norms as a set of atomic propo-
sitions and then employs a language to specify the update of norms. Although the
updates are parameterised over actions, no considerations are taken to investigate, by
either verification or norm synthesis, whether the normative system can be imposed to
coordinate agents’ behaviour to secure the objectives of the system.
Norm recognition. Norm recognition can be related to the norm learning problem,
which employs various approaches, such as data mining [21] and sampling and parsing
[22, 23], for the agent to learn social norms by observing other agents’ behaviour. On
the other hand, our norm recognition problems are based on formal verification, aiming
to decide whether the agents are designed well so that they can recognise the current
normative system from a set of possible ones. We also study the complexity of them.
Application of social norms Social norms are to regulate the behaviour of the stake-
holders in a system, including sociotechnical system [24] which has both humans and
computers. They are used to represent the commitments (by e.g., business contracts,
etc) between humans and organisations. The dynamic norms of this paper can be use-
ful to model more realistic scenarios in which commitments may be changed with the
environmental changes.
9. Conclusions
In the paper, we first present a novel definition of normative systems, by arguing
with an example that it can be a necessity to have multiple normative states. We study
the complexity of two autonomy issues related to normative systems. The decidability
(precisely, EXPTIME-complete) of norm synthesis is an encouraging result, suggesting
that the maximum number of normative states is bounded for CTL objectives. For the
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two norm recognition subproblems, one of them is, surprisingly, in PTIME and the
other is PSPACE-complete. Because the first one suggests a better level of autonomy,
to see if an agent can recognise the social norms, we can deploy a PTIME algorithm
first. If it fails, we may apply a PSPACE algorithm to check the weaker autonomy.
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